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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the small but growing body of literature which tries to explain why, 
despite the predictions of some theoretical studies, empirical support for the pollution haven 
hypothesis remains limited.  We break from the previous literature, which tends to concentrate 
on US trade patterns, and focus on Japan. In common with Ederington et al.’s (2005) US study, 
we show that pollution haven effects are stronger and more discernible when trade occurs with 
developing countries, in industries with the greatest environmental costs and when the 
geographical immobility of an industry is accounted for.  We also go one step further and show 
that our findings relate not only to environmental regulations but also to industrial regulations 
more generally.  
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The potential link between the stringency of environmental regulations and international trade 
and investment patterns has been discussed by politicians, academics and the media for over two 
decades, yet such issues remain high on the international policy agenda. The recent US proposal 
to impose carbon tariffs on imports of carbon-intensive goods such as steel, cement, paper and 
glass from countries that have not taken steps to reduce their own emissions provides a case in 
point. India has already expressed its strong opposition to such plans, while the WTO is 
concerned that there may be a profusion of unilateral climate-related trade restrictions of this 
nature, particularly given the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations to achieve an   
international climate change agreement. The conventional wisdom amongst policy makers 
therefore suggests a clear link between regulation costs and trade flows, a position often 
supported by the predictions of many theoretical studies (e.g. McGuire 1982, Baumol and Oates 
1988, Chichilnisky 1994). However, a sizeable empirical literature has failed to find compelling 
evidence to support the hypothesis that pollution intensive industries in developed economies 
will migrate to less regulated economies (e.g. Kalt 1988, Tobey 1990, Grossman and Krueger 
1993 and Cole and Elliott 2003a). 
 
More recent studies have therefore focused on the reasons why industries in highly regulated 
economies do not systematically relocate in this manner.  Antweiler et al. (2001) argued that trade 
in pollution intensive industries may be subject to both pollution haven and traditional factor 
endowment pressures.  More specifically, since pollution intensive industries are typically the 
most capital intensive, these different pressures may actually compete against each other and 
hence tend to cancel out (Antweiler et al. 2001, Cole and Elliott 2003b and Cole and Elliott 2005).  
In addition, Ederington and Minier (2003) and Levinson and Taylor (2008) raise the possibility 
that environmental regulations may act as secondary trade barriers i.e. a means of protecting 3 
 
domestic industry.  If this is the case, then the stringency of regulations may be a function of 
trade as well as trade being a function of regulations.  When treated as an endogenous variable, 
both Levinson and Taylor (2008) and Ederington and Minier (2003) find that US environmental 
regulations do influence US trade patterns.   
 
Ederington et al. (2005) suggest that there may be three reasons for the lack of evidence in 
support of the pollution haven hypothesis.  Firstly, since most trade occurs between developed 
economies which have similar levels of regulatory stringency, an analysis of aggregate trade flows 
is unlikely to detect the impact of regulations on patterns of trade between high and low income 
economies.  Second, for most industries environmental costs form a very small proportion of 
total costs.  As such, the pressure to physically relocate may be relatively minor for many 
industries.  However, there are a small subset of industries for whom such costs may be more 
considerable and who may therefore be subject to pollution haven pressures.  Finally, 
Ederington et al. (2005) argue that some industries are more footloose than others.  Those that 
experience high transport costs, high plant fixed costs or benefit from agglomeration economies 
may tend to be less geographically mobile. 
 
Thus, by mixing industries that are both relatively immobile and relatively footloose, previous 
analyses may have failed to detect pollution haven pressures amongst the footloose industries.  
Using US industry-level data for the period 1978-92, Ederington et al. find some evidence to 
support each of these three points. 
1  In a theoretical study, Zeng and Zhao (2009) focus on one 
aspect of industry immobility – the existence of agglomeration economies – and illustrate how 
such economies can negate pollution haven pressures, particularly if differences in regulatory 
stringency between ‘North’ and ‘South’ are relatively small.  Finally, Wagner and Timmins (2009) 
                                                            
1 However, Levinson (2009) concludes that the shifting of pollution intensive activities overseas has had only a 
minor effect on US air quality levels which have, in the main, benefitted from changing technology. 4 
 
illustrate the importance of agglomeration economies to German FDI flows from pollution 
intensive industries and show that pollution haven effects are detectable when such 
agglomeration economies are controlled for. 
 
The previous literature therefore suggests that regulations may influence certain firms’ relocation 
patterns in a manner consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis but many previous studies 
were failing to detect this by not targeting the most relevant industries or trade with the most 
relevant economies.  However, to date, the only compelling evidence for this assertion, in the 
context of trade flows, is provided by Ederington et al. (2005) for US industries.  What remains 
unknown therefore is whether this finding is specific to the US, particularly given its close trade 
links and common border with Mexico, or whether it would be common to all major industrial 
economies.  Secondly, the dataset used by Ederington et al. ends in 1992 and hence we are 
unclear whether such findings may be specific to the period under consideration, primarily the 
1980s, or whether such pressures are detectable more recently. 
 
The aim of the present paper is therefore to focus on a major industrial economy other than the 
US, namely Japan, and to assess whether pollution haven pressures on trade flows are detectable 
if we focus on the more appropriate trading partners and more appropriate industries in the 
manner suggested by Ederington et al.  In addition to examining the stringency of environmental 
regulations, we go beyond the analysis of Ederington et al. by also considering a measure of 
general industrial regulations.  This allows us to assess whether Japanese trade flows are 
influenced by industrial and labour regulations alongside environmental regulations. 
 
Japan represents an ideal country for a study of this type.  The data we analyse are for the years 
1989-2003.  This was a period of significant change in both trade and the regulatory framework 
in Japan.  From the early 1990s Japan entered a period of relative economic stagnation following 5 
 
the bursting of the asset bubble.  This was a period when Japan had to undertake structural 
reforms and take measures to revitalise domestic industry as well as dealing with deflation and 
non-performing loans.
2  Until the 1980s, the Japanese economy grew by producing domestically 
competitive products and discovering new markets abroad.  The appreciation of the Yen in the 
mid-1980s forced many firms to shift production to East Asia.  These production networks are 
now an important part of the Japanese economy. 
 
Even though the 1990s were a period of stagnation, Japan continued to experience a steady 
increase in imports and exports and managed to maintain a surplus throughout this period.  
Concern remains, however, that expansion abroad and a maturing domestic market led to a 
contraction of Japan’s industrial base.  Outward foreign direct investment (FDI) remained high 
during this period particularly to the US and East Asian regions.  In 2002 17.7% and 35.3% of 
imports were from the US and the EU, respectively, while 10.9% of exports went to the US and 
38% of exports to the EU.  China was responsible for 5.1% and 4.5% of exports and imports 
respectively.  The remaining share consists of considerable trade with the other developing 
countries including significant oil imports from the Middle East (JETRO 2003).  In terms of 
trade openness (imports plus exports divided by GDP), Japan presents a remarkably similar 
picture to the US with a value of 22.07 in 2003 compared to 23.39 for the US. The UK in 
contrast is 55.62 and 47.38 for China (Penn World Tables 6.2). 
 
While the Japanese economy has historically been highly regulated, a process of deregulation 
began in the late 1990s in an attempt to increase Japanese competitiveness. This process is 
ongoing although Japan would still appear to be a highly regulated economy particularly in areas 
                                                            
2 In the 1990s Japan implemented significant tax cuts aimed at revitalising the domestic economy.  Ares that the 
reforms were targeted at included research and development investment, capital investment and financial support 
for small and medium sized enterprises.  6 
 
such as finance, telecommunications and transport. Other areas such as health and safety and 
environmental protection have generally seen increased regulation in recent years.  
 
With regard to environmental regulation, following a series of environmental disasters in the 
1950s and 1960s Japan is often considered to be at the forefront of the introduction and 
implementation of environmental policy.  In 1970 six new environmental laws were enacted and 
a further eight were tightened.  The 1990s saw a further tightening of environmental legislation 
and in 1993 Japan implemented what became known as the Basic Environment Law.  In 1997 
Japan hosted the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change which resulted in the Kyoto 
Protocol and thrust international environmental issues to the forefront of Japan’s industrial 
policy.  Finally, in 2001 a Ministry of the Environment was set up, incorporating the previous 
roles of the Environment Agency, taking environmental policy into the heart of government 
decision making.  The culmination of these various policies is that Japan “…established one of 
the cleanest environments earlier than most OECD countries (Sumikura (1998 pp. 255) and 
demonstrated that a good environmental reputation is not only good for the environment but is 
also a valuable economic and cultural asset.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 describes the methodology and 




In common with the previous literature on trade and the pollution haven hypothesis, we test the 
impact of regulations on trade patterns using industry-level data for the manufacturing sector.  
Specifically, we begin by estimating, using fixed effects, the determinants of industry-level net 7 
 
imports for 41 Japanese manufacturing sectors over the period 1989-2003, in accordance with 
equation (1) below; 
 
Mit = αi + λt +β1KLit + β2Tit + β3Rit + εit        (1) 
 
 
where Mit denotes net imports in industry i and year t, defined as imports minus exports divided 
by industry value added.
3  KL denotes the capital-labour ratio, defined as physical capital stock 
per worker; T represents tariffs, measured as tariff revenues as a share of imports in each 
industry; αi is an industry specific intercept and λt  is a year specific dummy.  
 
R denotes regulations, for which we have two measures. The first is a measure of environmental 
regulation costs which we denote as ENVREG. The disposal of industrial waste in Japan is 
subject to stringent regulation and can prove costly to firms. ENVREG measures the costs 
incurred by industries when disposing of industrial waste as they are required to by law, where 
waste includes scrap iron and steel, paper, glass, oil waste, polluted mud/sludge, acid, plastics, 
dust and rubble. Note that these costs do not include the cost of abating standard local air 
pollutants such as sulphur dioxide but are nevertheless costs incurred by firms when complying 
with Japanese environmental regulations. As such they provide an ideal measure of regulation 
costs for our study.  Waste costs are expressed per unit of output. Industry-level environmental 
regulation cost data such as these are reported for relatively few countries with the US leading 
the field in terms of data availability.  It is for this reason that the emphasis of industry-level 
pollution haven studies is firmly on the US economy with studies of other countries tending to 
use proxies for regulation costs such as pollution intensity or survey results (Xing and Kolstad 
2002 and Wagner and Timmins 2009). 
 
                                                            
3Data are from the JIP dataset produced by the Japanese Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(RIETI).  Table A1 in the Appendix provides definitions and sources for all variables. 8 
 
Our second measure of regulation, INDREG, is a measure of the coverage of general regulations 
within an industry.  This measure, constructed by Japan’s Research Institute of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (RIETI) as part of the JIP database, is calculated by examining 303 four-digit 
sectors within 110 three-digit sectors within the 41 two-digit manufacturing sectors in our 
sample and assessing whether they are subject to approximately 3,000 industrial regulations 
within Japan.
4  If all four-digit sectors within a three-digit sector are regulated by one of more of 
these regulations then the three-digit sector is classed as being ‘regulated’.  INDREG is 
constructed by aggregating the value added of regulated three-digit sectors and expressing it as a 
share of value added within the two-digit sector as a whole.  For instance, if an industry has a 
INDREG value of 50 this implies that those three-digit industries that we class as being 
‘regulated’ (because all four-digit sectors within them are subject to at least one of the 3,000 
regulations) contribute 50% to the two-digit industry’s value added. Equation 2 INDREG; 
 
         ( 2 )  
 
Where i refers to a two-digit industry, t refers to year, VA refers to value added and Rj denotes a 
regulated three-digit industry. The regulations considered within the INDREG measure cover all 
aspects of activity, and relate to finance, labour, trade and health and safety, for example. Also 
included are environmental regulations implying a degree of overlap between our two regulation 




4  The industrial classification used (JIP) is specific to Japan and does not conform precisely to international 
classifications such as International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) and Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC). 9 
 
Appendix Table A3 provides the 10 most regulated industries according to our two regulation 
measures.  With regard to ENVREG, many of these industries would confirm to prior 
expectations and include Basic Chemicals, Chemical Products, Rubber, Paper Production and 
Plastic Products.  These industries are often shown to be amongst the most pollution intensive 
in the US and the UK for whom industry level emissions data are available (see for example Cole 
et al. 2005). With regard to our general measure of industrial regulations, INDREG, we see a 
variety of different industries in the top 10, including high-tech electrical equipment, machinery 
production of various forms and chemical industries. This mixture of industries would seem to 
be influenced by a wide range of different regulations although health and safety regulations 
would seem to be a possible common denominator. 
 
Following Ederington et al. (2005), our aim is to test (i) whether pollution haven effects are 
discernible if we focus on trade with developing regions rather than aggregate trade flows (ii) 
whether such effects are discernible if take into account the fact that some firms are more 
footloose than others and (iii) whether pollution haven effects can be detected within industries 
with larger regulation costs.  In addition, for each of these hypotheses we test the effect of 
environmental regulations and general regulations on trade separately.  
 
To test point (i) we estimate separately the determinants of industry-level total net imports from 
the world as a whole; net imports from the developing world; and net imports from China
5.  We 
would expect the impact of regulations on net imports to be greater in terms of magnitude, and 
perhaps statistical significance, for net imports with the developing world and China.
6   
                                                            
5 Japan undertakes significant outsourcing to China and since 2004 China has become the largest recipient of 
Japanese FDI within Asia (Japan External Trade Organization). China has therefore become a significant source of 
intermediate goods for the Japanese economy. 
6 In common with the existing pollution haven literature, we are only able to estimate net imports as a function of 
domestic environmental regulations as opposed to those of the trading partner. We are therefore assuming that such 
industry-specific domestic regulations provide a ‘push-factor’ but cannot explicitly measure the ‘pull factor’ provided 10 
 
 
Regarding point (ii) we wish to examine whether certain industries are less responsive to 
environmental regulations, and industrial regulations in general, because they are inherently less 
mobile.  Similarly, we might expect more footloose industries to show greater sensitivity to 
changes in regulation costs.  We capture an industry’s mobility in two ways.  First we use a 
measure of average transport costs within an industry which we denote as TRANS.  The 
argument here is that industries with large transport costs cannot locate far from their customers 
and hence will be less inclined to relocate in the face of regulation costs.  Using HS 9 digit data 
on Japanese exports we calculate the unit value of each sector (value to weight ratio), defined as 
1000 Yen of output per Kg. We then calculate the average unit value within each of our 41 
industries.  For ease of interpretation we take the reciprocal of the unit value to obtain a measure 
of immobility in the form of a weight to value ratio (Kg per 1000 Yen of value).  We expect 
regulation costs to have a smaller effect on net imports in industries with large transport costs.
7   
 
The second measure of immobility captures agglomeration economies within an industry and is 
denoted as AGGLOM.  If an industry is benefiting from such economies it will be reluctant to 
relocate to avoid regulations unless the benefits of relocation (in terms of regulation costs 
avoided) exceed the lost agglomeration economies.  In short, we would expect regulation costs 
to have a smaller impact on net imports in industries with larger agglomeration economies.  To 
measure agglomeration economies we used a Gini index capturing the distribution of firms 
                                                                                                                                                                          
by overseas regulations. Nevertheless, we expect the impact of Japanese regulations to be greater on net imports 
from China and the developing world since anecdotal evidence suggests that Japanese regulations are more stringent 
than those in China and the developing world. 
7 We acknowledge that, when considering transport costs, firms are concerned with both the weight of the product 
and the distance it has to be shipped. Nevertheless, we believe our weight based measure provides a good indication 
of the magnitude of transport costs that an firm or industry is likely to incur.  11 
 
across 47 prefectures for each industry.  The greater the Gini index the greater the unevenness 
(or inequality) of the distribution and hence the greater the agglomeration of firms.
8  
 
To assess the extent to which an industry’s immobility influences the impact of regulations on 
trade, we interact our measures of regulations with our measures of immobility and include them 
in equation (1).  We predict the coefficient on such interactions will be negative and statistically 
significant, implying that the overall effect of regulations on net imports is lower the greater the 
degree of immobility. 
 
Finally, regarding point (iii) above, we wish to examine whether regulation costs have little 
overall impact on net imports because they tend to form only a small proportion of total costs in 
the majority of industries.  We test this in two ways. First, we interact our two regulation 
measures with the average level of regulation within the industry over our sample period (i.e. we 
interact ENVREG with average ENVREG and we interact INDREG with average INDREG).  
A positive, statistically significant, coefficient on such an interaction would indicate that an 
increase in regulation costs has a greater impact on net imports the higher the average level of 
regulation costs.  Second, we create a dummy variable for the 5 industries with the greatest level 
of INDREG and ENVREG.  We then interact these dummy variables with the appropriate 
regulation measure (INDREG and ENVREG).  These interaction variables therefore allow us to 
test whether the level of regulations in the most highly regulated industries has an impact on net 
imports over and above the impact of regulations across all industries.
9  
                                                            
8  Appendix A4 provides the 10 most immobile (i.e. least footloose) industries according to our measure of 
agglomeration economies (AGGLOM) and transport costs (TRANS).  Agglomeration effects in Japan could be 
offset if new industry “agglomerations” develop in other countries.  The generation of industrial clusters is 
increasingly being used as part of industrial policy and a means of attracting FDI to a region or country. 
9  A third way of addressing this point would be to include a squared term for INDREG and ENVREG. In 







Tables 1-3 provide our estimation results.  Table 1 reports the estimation of our basic model, as 
set out in equation (1), where measures of immobility are omitted.  Columns 1-3 provide the 
results for total net imports (from the world), net imports from the non-OECD and net imports 
from China, respectively, using our waste costs measure of regulation costs.  Columns 4-6 do the 
same but replace waste costs with our measure of general industrial regulations, while columns 7-
9 include both measures of regulations.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
With regard to our regulation variables we see that the coefficients on both measures are positive 
and statistically significant for net imports from all three geographical groupings.  To provide 
some insight into the magnitude of the regulation effects, Table 4 provides elasticities calculated 
at the means of the relevant variables for the full specification models 7 to 9. We find that a 1% 
increase in ENVREG would increase total net imports by 0.13%, non-OECD net imports by 
0.14% and Chinese net imports by 1.28%.  Comparable figures for a 1% increase in INDREG 
are 1.15% for total net imports, 1.41% for non-OECD net imports and 2.54% for Chinese net 
imports.  In common with the findings of Ederington et al. (2005), we therefore also find the 
magnitude of the impact of regulations to be greater in the context of trade with developing 
regions.  However, in contrast to Ederington et al.’s US findings, we do still find Japanese 
regulations to have a statistically significant effect on net imports from the world as a whole. 
 13 
 
As expected, the coefficient on the capital labour ratio is negative and generally statistically 
significant, particularly for net imports from the non-OECD.  The coefficients on tariffs are 
negative for total net imports and net imports from the non-OECD but positive for net imports 
from China.  However, in each case they are statistically insignificant.
10 
 
Table 2 reports estimates of an extended model where we include AGGLOM, our measure of 
agglomeration economies intended to capture an industry’s immobility.  Columns 1-3 include 
AGGLOM, ENVREG and an interaction of the two, again for our three geographical groupings. 
Columns 4-6 replace waste costs with our measure of general industrial regulations, including an 
interaction with AGGLOM, and columns 7-9 include both measures of regulations and both 
interactions.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The coefficient on the capital labour ratio remains negative throughout and now displays greater 
statistical significance.  The sign and (lack of) significance of tariffs is similar to that in Table 1.
11  
Turning to AGGLOM, our measure of agglomeration economies, we see that it is generally a 
negative determinant of net imports and is statistically significant for China.  This suggests that 
industries that benefit from agglomeration economies are likely to experience lower net imports 
from China, as we might expect.  However, it is the interactions with ENVREG and INDREG 
that interest us most.  We can see that the coefficient on AGGLOM interacted with ENVREG 
                                                            
10  Our tariff variable is an aggregation of all tariff revenues from all countries and does not take account of 
preferential tariffs or regional trade agreements. Such a measure is consistent with previous studies (for example 
Ederington et al. 2005). The lack of statistical significance may reflect the relatively high level of industry aggregation 
in this study which may be preventing tariff revenues from having a meaningful impact on net imports. In addition, 
our industry fixed effects may be partly capturing the effects of tariffs due to the relative lack of temporal variance 
within this variable. 
11 In unreported estimations we interacted tariffs with both AGGLOM and TRANS but the coefficients on these 
interactions were not statistically significant. 14 
 
is negative in all models and statistically significant for net imports from the OECD. Similarly, 
the coefficient on AGGLOM interacted with INDREG is also negative but displays even greater 
statistical significance.  These results therefore indicate that while regulations costs (however 
measured) increase net imports, this effect is reduced in industries that are relatively immobile.  
 
In terms of elasticities as reported in Table 4, we find that a 1% increase in ENVREG will 
increase total net imports by 0.11%, non-OECD net imports by 0.16% and Chinese net imports 
by 1.18%, at the sample mean level of AGGLOM.  However, for a relatively immobile industry 
at the top 25
th percentile of AGGLOM, a 1% increase in ENVREG has a smaller impact, 
increasing total net imports by 0.07%, non-OECD net imports by 0.10% and Chinese net 
imports by 1.09%.  
 
With regard to our second measure of regulations, a 1% increase in INDREG will increase total 
net imports by 1.10%, non-OECD imports by 1.21% and Chinese net imports by 2.20%, at the 
mean level of AGGLOM. For an industry at the top 25
th percentile of AGGLOM we again find 
regulations to have a smaller effect.  At this level of AGGLOM a 1% increase in INDREG will 
increase total net imports by 0.93%, non-OECD net imports by 1.01% and Chinese net imports 
by 1.23%. 
 
Table 3 is equivalent to Table 2 but AGGLOM has been replaced as a measure of immobility 
with a measure of transport costs (TRANS).  On its own we can see that the coefficient on 
TRANS is generally negative and statistically significant in four of the nine models, notably in 
the models of trade with China and the non-OECD.  This suggests that industries with greater 
transport costs are likely to experience lower net imports from China and the developing world, 
perhaps due to their immobility.  Turning to the interactions between TRANS and our two 
measures of regulations, we can see that the coefficient on TRANS interacted with ENVREG is 15 
 
insignificant throughout and of mixed sign.  However, the coefficients on TRANS interacted 
with INDREG are negative and consistently significant in all models.  
 
[tTable 3 about here] 
 
From Table 4, a 1% increase in INDREG will increase total net imports by 0.26%, non-OECD 
net imports by 0.29% and Chinese net imports by 0.30% at the mean level of TRANS.  As in 
Table 2, the effects of INDREG on net imports can be seen to be smaller in the presence of 
immobility, here measured in the form of transport costs.  In a relatively immobile industry, 
where TRANS is at the top 25
th percentile, a 1% increase in INDREG will increase total net 
imports by 0.06%, non-OECD net imports by 0.17% and Chinese net imports by 0.18%. 
12 
 
Tables 5 and 6 provide the results from testing our third hypothesis, whether the effect of 
regulations on net imports is more discernible in high regulation cost industries.  For reasons of 
space we concentrate on net imports from the non-OECD and from China.  In Table 5, 
columns 1-4 include our measure of ENVREG interacted with the average level of ENVREG 
within each industry over the sample period, with columns 1 and 2 including AGGLOM as the 
measure of immobility and columns 3 and 4 including TRANS as the measure of immobility.  
Columns 5-8 instead include ENVREG interacted with a dummy variable equal to one for the 
five industries with the greatest average level of ENVREG. 
13  Columns 5 and 6 include 
AGGLOM, columns 7 and 8 include TRANS. Table 6 replicates Table 5 using INDREG instead 
of ENVREG. 
                                                            
12 We also estimate models in which we include both TRANS and AGGLOM together with their interactions with 
INDREG and ENVREG.  The sign and significance of these variables was almost identical to those in Tables 1-3 
and hence for reasons of space we do not report these results. 
13 In unreported sensitivity analyses we also tested a dummy capturing the ten industries with the greatest average 
level of ENVREG. Results were almost identical. 16 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
With regard to Table 5, we can see that the coefficient on ENVREG interacted with average 
ENVREG over the sample period is positive in three of the four models and significant in one 
of those. In the other model it is negative and statistically insignificant.  The positive coefficients 
imply that ENVREG has a greater effect on net imports the greater the level of average 
ENVREG within an industry. However, the limited statistical significance reduces the strength 
of this finding.  Turning to ENVREG interacted with a high ENVREG dummy variable in 
columns 5-8 we can see that the coefficient on this interaction variable is positive in all four 
models and statistically significant in two of these.  This therefore suggests that in the 5 ‘dirtiest’ 
industries ENVREGs have an impact on net imports over and above the average impact across 
all industries (as captured by the coefficient on the ENVREG variable). Table 6 provides very 
similar conclusions for INDREG. For both INDREG interacted with average INDREG and 
INDREG interacted with a high INDREG dummy there are four positive, significant 
coefficients with the remainder insignificant and of mixed sign. We have therefore found some 
evidence that INDREG has a greater effect on net imports the greater the level of INDREG 
within an industry. 
 
In contrast to this finding, Ederington et al. find that regulation costs interacted with average 
regulation costs is actually a negative statistically significant determinant of net imports. This 
seemingly counterintuitive result suggests that environmental costs have a smaller impact in 
pollution intensive industries. However, once the immobility variables are included in the 
equation regulation costs interacted with average regulation costs becomes statistically 
insignificant. These two findings would seem to indicate that high regulation cost (pollution 
intensive) industries are also less footloose. For Japan, we find that ENVREG*ave and 17 
 
INDREG*ave is statistically significant, in some models, even once immobility measures are 
included suggesting that regulation costs have a greater impact on net imports in high regulation 
cost industries. One possible reason for this slight difference in our findings relative to those of 
Ederington et al. may be that the correlation between immobility and regulation costs may be 
lower in Japan than the US.





This paper finds environmental and industrial regulations to be statistically significant 
determinants of Japanese net imports from the rest of the world, from the non-OECD countries 
and from China. We also find the magnitude of the impact of regulations on trade flows to be 
greatest on trade flows with the developing world. 
 
In line with Ederington et al. (2005), we find that the degree to which an industry is footloose can 
have a major influence on the extent to which regulations influence its net imports.  Using 
agglomeration economies and transport costs to capture an industry’s immobility, we find that 
the greater the level of immobility within an industry the smaller the effect of regulations on net 
imports. Finally, we find that the impact of regulations on net imports is greater the higher the 
average regulation costs are within the industry.  
 
In common with Ederington et al. (2005) and Cole and Elliott (2005) this paper therefore 
supports the argument that while pollution haven effects may not be experienced by all 
                                                            
14 The Spearman correlation coefficient between ENVREG and AGGLOM is 0.083 (p-value 0.027) and between 
ENVREG and TRANS is 0.16 (p-value 0.000). Ederington et al. do not report such correlations for the US. 18 
 
industries, such effects are greatest, and most detectable, when trade occurs between developed 
and developing economies and in relatively mobile industries with high regulations costs.  
 
In terms of the policy implications of our findings, Japan has acknowledged that in order to 
maintain its competitive position it needs to maintain a leading presence in R&D, to build on 
existing agglomerations and to foster new clusters and to attract the best capital and minds from 
around the world.  Our study suggests that an additional benefit from agglomeration is that it can 
yield benefits sufficient to offset relatively high environmental costs thereby protecting jobs in 
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APPENDIX 1.  Data Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
Total net M  Net imports from the world as a share of 
value added (in million Yen) 
JIP dataset from the Japanese 
Research Institute of 




Net imports from the non-OECD as a 
share of value added (in million Yen) 
JIP dataset from RIETI 
Chinese net M  Net imports from China as a share of value 
added (in million Yen) 
JIP dataset from RIETI 
K/L  Physical capital stock per worker (in million 
Yen) 
JIP dataset from RIETI 
TARIFF  Tariff revenues as a share of imports   JIP dataset from RIETI 
ENVREG  Waste disposal costs per unit of output  JIP dataset from RIETI 
INDREG  A measure of the coeverage of regulations 
within an industry 
JIP dataset from RIETI 
AGGLOM  Agglomeration economies  measured as a 
Gini index capturing the distribution of 
firms across 47 prefectures 
Japanese Manufacturing 
Census 
TRANS  Transport costs proxied using the unit value 
of each industry (1000 Yen per kg). 
Custom data from the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance 
Note. All variables are measured at the industry-level. 
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APPENDIX 2. Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Total net M  -52.12  199.76  -847.52  1199.84 
Non-OECD 
netM  
-36.33 104.57  -329.05  496.38 
Chinese net M  3.46  22.44  -109.19  157.57 
K/L 23.92  27.85  1.32  201.54 
TARIFF 4.13  2.03  0  10.83 
ENVREG 0.52 1.32  0  7.94 
INDREG 10.87  24.35  0  100 
AGGLOM 0.55 0.094 0.30  0.79 
TRANS 12.86  10.93  0  69.77 
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APPENDIX 3. The Most Regulated Japanese Industries  
 
Most regulated industries (ENVREG)  Most regulated Industries (INDREG) 
Inorganic basic chemicals  TV and radio receivers, sound and 
video equipment  
Rubber Chemical  fertilizers 
Furniture  Other transport machinery 
Final chemical products  Electrical machinery 
Paper production  Other electrical machinery 
Publishing Precision  Machinery 
Other manufacturing products  Inorganic basic chemicals 
TV and radio receivers, sound and 
video equipment  
Other manufacturing products 
Leather and leather products  Final chemical products 
Plastic products  Non-ferrous metal products 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
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APPENDIX 4. The Most Immobile Japanese Industries  
 
Most Immobile industries (AGGLOM) Most Immobile Industries (TRANS) 
Leather and leather products  Chemical fertilizers  
Rubber Motor  vehicles 
Precision machinery  Cement and cement products 
Non-ferrous metal refining  Other iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metal products  Chemical fibre and textiles 
Motor vehicle components  Pulp and paper 
Other transport machinery  Motor vehicle components 
Motor vehicles   Metal products for construction 
Publishing  Pig iron and steel 
Office and computing machinery  Furniture 




Table 1. Basic models, without interactions.  
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9) 
 Total  Non-
OECD 
China Total  Non-
0ECD 
China Total  Non-
OECD 
China 
K/L  -0.23 -0.25  -0.074 -0.35* -0.31**  -0.085  -0.37* -0.32**  -0.095 
  (0.9) (1.6)  (1.1)  (1.7)  (2.2) (1.3) (1.7)  (2.3)  (1.5) 
TARIFF  -2.88 -0.26  0.70  -3.64  -0.60 0.64  -3.74  -0.68 0.57 
  (1.0) (0.2)  (1.5)  (1.2)  (0.4) (1.4) (1.2)  (0.5)  (1.3) 
ENVREG  10.88*** 9.07***  8.20***        13.00***  10.10***  8.51*** 
  (3.1) (3.7)  (4.6)        (3.6)  (4.2)  (4.9) 
INDREG        5.37*** 2.59***  0.71***  5.53*** 4.72***  0.81*** 
        (5.5) (3.8)  (4.0)  (5.7) (4.0)  (4.8) 
Constant -56.59***  -38.86***  -8.84***  -103.57***  -59.79*** -11.88*** -111.14*** -65.67*** -16.84*** 
  (4.0) (6.1)  (4.1)  (6.3)  (6.6) (4.6) (6.7)  (7.1)  (6.4) 
Observations  579 579  579  579  579 579 579  579  579 
R-squared  0.081  0.064  0.073 0.050 0.045  0.11 0.090 0.080  0.13 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Industry and year effects included. 
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Table 2. Using Agglomeration Economies (AGGLOM) as a measure of immobility. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9) 
 Total  Non-OECD China  Total  Non-OECD China  Total  Non-OECD China 
K/L  -0.42* -0.25  -0.14**  -0.64*** -0.40***  -0.20*** -0.63***  -0.39***  -0.19*** 
  (1.7)  (1.6) (2.3)  (3.2)  (3.5) (3.4)  (3.1)  (3.4) (3.2) 
TARIFF  -3.30 -0.14  0.53  -3.60  0.052  0.64  -3.53  0.14  0.67 
  (1.1)  (0.1) (1.2)  (1.1)  (0.0) (1.6)  (1.1)  (0.1) (1.6) 
AGGLOM  -400.22 60.58  -145.40**  -330.04  145.90  -135.61**  -234.77  248.40  -77.55 
  (0.8)  (0.4) (2.3)  (0.6)  (0.9) (2.0)  (0.4)  (1.5) (1.2) 
ENVREG  34.35 44.37**  11.62        40.73  47.73**  12.66 
  (1.0) (2.4)  (1.2)        (1.2)  (2.4)  (1.3) 
AGGLOM*ENVREG  -48.10 -63.80**  -8.12        -54.32  -66.25**  -8.80 
  (0.9) (2.0)  (0.5)        (1.0)  (2.0)  (0.5) 
INDREG       11.82***  9.63***  3.19***  12.19***  10.01***  3.44*** 
       (3.2)  (6.1)  (4.7)  (3.2)  (6.4)  (5.3) 
AGGLOM*INDREG       -12.15*  -13.41***  -4.67*** -12.57* -10.84***  -4.98*** 
       (1.7)  (4.3)  (3.8)  (1.7)  (4.5)  (4.2) 
Constant 175.72  -72.67  75.38**  94.94  -133.22  69.43*  35.08  -197.30**  31.96 
  (0.6)  (0.8) (2.1)  (0.3)  (1.5) (1.8)  (0.1)  (2.1) (0.8) 
Observations  579  579 579  579  579 579  579  579 579 
R-squared 0.10  0.11  0.14  0.060  0.050  0.13  0.11  0.14  0.18 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Industry and year effects included.27 
 
 
Table 3. Using transport costs (TRANS) as a measure of immobility. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Total Non-OECD China Total  Non-OECD China Total Non-OECD China 
K/L  -0.25 -0.48***  -0.20***  -0.38**  -0.55***  -0.22*** -0.39** -0.55***  -0.22*** 
  (1.1)  (3.1)  (3.3) (2.1)  (4.5)  (4.1) (2.1)  (4.5)  (4.1) 
TARIFF  -2.95  0.39 0.85*  -2.59  0.26 1.05**  -2.75  0.12 0.93** 
  (1.0)  (0.0)  (1.8) (0.9)  (0.2)  (2.2) (1.0)  (0.1)  (2.0) 
TRANS  -0.37 -4.60***  -2.54***  4.78 -1.94  -1.35*** 4.64  -2.06  -1.44*** 
  (0.1)  (3.6)  (5.0) (1.3)  (1.3)  (3.7) (1.3)  (1.3)  (4.0) 
ENVREG  10.94*** 10.41***  8.30***       12.40***  11.14***  8.60*** 
  (2.7) (3.5)  (3.8)        (2.8) (3.5)  (3.7) 
TRANS*ENVREG -0.18 0.016  0.0019        0.11  0.16  0.069 
  (0.6) (0.1)  (0.0)        (0.5) (1.3)  (0.7) 
INDREG        3.46***  1.84** 0.41* 3.56***  1.91** 0.47** 
        (3.3)  (2.3) (1.8)  (3.3)  (2.4) (2.1) 
TRANS*INDREG       -0.19***  -0.095***  -0.041*** -0.18*** -0.073***  -0.029*** 
        (4.8)  (5.0) (7.7)  (4.7)  (4.9) (7.3) 
Constant -62.04  -94.33***  -39.27***  -53.26  -88.49*** -30.57***  -60.82  -94.81*** -35.87*** 
  (1.4)  (5.7)  (6.0) (1.0)  (4.2)  (6.0) (1.2)  (4.5)  (7.0) 
Observations  579  579  579 579  579  579 579  579  579 
R-squared  0.14  0.19  0.22 0.052  0.10  0.20 0.15  0.20  0.27 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




Table 4. Estimated Elasticities for ENVREG and INDREG from Tables 1, 2 and 3 
 
 Total  Non-OECD  China 
ENVREG (from Table 1)  0.13  0.14  1.28 
ENVREG (from Table 2)  0.11  0.16  1.18 
ENVREG (from Table 3)  0.14  0.19  1.43 
      
INDREG (from Table 1)  1.15  1.41  2.54 
INDREG (from Table 2)  1.10  1.21  2.20 
INDREG (from Table 3)  0.26  0.29  0.30 
Estimated elasticities are from the full specification in each Table (models 7, 8 and 9) 29 
 
Table 5. Including ENVREG interacted with average industry waste costs and a high waste cost dummy. 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
  Non-OECD China  Non-OECD China  Non-OECD China  Non-OECD China 
K/L  -0.25 -0.14**  -0.46***  -0.19***  -0.23 -0.14**  -0.48***  -0.20*** 
  (1.6) (2.3)  (2.9) (3.2)  (1.5) (2.2)  (3.1) (3.3) 
TARIFF  -0.14 0.52 -0.012  0.83*  -0.37 0.46 0.080 0.92* 
  (0.1) (1.2)  (0.0) (1.8)  (0.3) (1.0)  (0.1) (1.9) 
ENVREG  45.42** 7.02  29.01***  12.46***  90.43***  26.54* 9.07*** 5.90*** 
  (2.2) (0.7)  (2.9) (2.7)  (3.4) (1.9)  (3.3) (3.4) 
ENVREG*ave  -0.11  0.47  0.97**  0.89       
  (0.2) (1.4)  (2.2) (1.0)         
ENVREG*dum        40.70**  13.18  3.87  6.83*** 
        (2.3)  (1.4)  (1.2)  (3.5) 
AGGLOM  60.32 -144.28**      82.84 -138.19**     
  (0.4) (2.3)      (0.5) (2.2)     
AGGLOM*ENVREG  -65.14* -2.14      -76.04**  -12.09    
  (1.9) (0.1)      (2.3) (0.7)     
TRANS     -4.47***  -2.51***     -4.66***  -2.66*** 
     (3.6)  (5.1)     (3.7)  (5.0) 
TRANS*ENVREG     33.63  5.73     150.85  239.19** 
     (0.3)  (0.1)     (0.7)  (2.1) 
Constant -72.47  74.48**  -95.00***  -39.42*** -87.52  70.57*  -95.37***  -41.10*** 
  (0.8) (2.0)  (5.9) (6.1)  (1.0) (1.9)  (5.8) (6.0) 
Observations 579 579  579 579  579 579  579 579 
R-squared 0.050  0.14  0.10  0.22  0.060  0.14  0.10  0.21 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Industry and year effects included. ENVREG*ave is ENVREG multiplied by average ENVREG within each industry over time. ENVREG*dum is 
ENVREG interacted with a dummy =1 for the 5 industries with the highest levels of ENVREG. 30 
 
Table 6. Including INDREG interacted with average INDREG and a high INDREG dummy. 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
  Non-OECD China  Non-OECD China  Non-OECD China  Non-OECD China 
K/L  -0.47*** -0.25***  -0.56*** -0.23***  -0.46*** -0.22***  -0.57*** -0.27*** 
  (4.7) (4.7)  (4.8) (4.5)  (4.0) (4.4)  (4.4) (5.2) 
TARIFF  -0.98 60.43  22.79 99.80**  -39.04  43.81  35.74 66.00* 
  (0.0) (1.5)  (0.2) (2.1)  (0.3) (1.3)  (0.3) (1.9) 
INDREG  9.33*** 3.00***  1.85**  0.42**  8.64*** 3.33***  -0.14  -0.047 
  (5.9) (4.2)  (2.4) (2.5)  (4.0) (4.3)  (0.2) (0.3) 
INDREG*ave  -0.007 0.004***  -0.001 0.002**         
  (0.7) (3.2)  (0.4) (2.2)         
INDREG*dum        0.89  -0.15  2.23**  0.31** 
        (0.8)  (0.8)  (2.2)  (2.2) 
AGGLOM  157.88 -128.06*      275.88 -19.08     
  (1.0) (1.9)      (1.0) (0.2)     
AGGLOM*INDREG  -12.99*** -4.41***      -13.03*** -4.99***     
  (4.1) (3.5)      (3.6) (3.7)     
TRANS     -1.93  -1.33***     -2.17  -1.00*** 
     (1.2)  (3.6)     (1.4)  (3.0) 
TRANS*INDREG     -9.23***  -3.69***     -10.83***  -4.20*** 
     (4.3)  (6.1)     (5.4)  (6.6) 
Observations  579 579  579 579  579 579  579 579 
R-squared  0.13 0.17  0.19 0.23  0.12 0.18  0.21 0.26 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Industry and year effects included. INDREG*ave is INDREG multiplied by average INDREG within each industry over time. INDREG*dum is 
INDREG interacted with a dummy =1 for the 5 industries with the highest levels of INDREG. 
 